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WHAT WAS TANEY THINKING? AMERICAN INDIAN
CITIZENSHIP IN THE ERA OF DRED SCOTT
FREDERICK E. HOXIE*
INTRODUCTION
In addition to being an object of derision, Chief Justice Taney's opin-
ion in Dred Scott opens a window onto the way that lawyers and politicians
thought about constitutional issues in the antebellum era. That period-
particularly the decade of the 1850s when leaders struggled to understand
and control a dissolving American nation state-is in many ways a "lost
world" of ideas. The years surrounding the Dred Scott decision were a time
when articulate Americans tried to square the issues of democracy and
slavery; to balance the ambitions of equality with the racial privileges chis-
eled into governmental institutions; and to imagine a nation that was at
once decentralized, expanding, and united. The Chief Justice's statements
regarding American Indian citizenship in Dred Scott are an example of
these prewar intellectual gymnastics. Puzzling at first, Taney's observa-
tions illuminate the sharp distinctions between the way Native Americans
and African Americans were viewed by the courts in this prewar period. At
the same time, the Chief Justice's formulations help us comprehend the
actions of American Indian leaders of his day, particularly those from the
politically sophisticated slave-holding tribes that had been forcibly re-
moved from the East a generation before Dred Scott sought his freedom.
Taney's statements regarding Indian citizenship came early in his
opinion, at the point where he framed the central issue under dispute: "Can
a negro ... become a member of the political community formed and
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such
become entitled to all the rights, and privileges... guarantied by that in-
strument to the citizen?" As he began to explain why the answer to this
question should be no, Taney paused to compare African Americans to the
nation's indigenous population:
* Swanlund Professor of History, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
I. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857).
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The situation of this population was altogether unlike that of the Indian
race. The latter, it is true, formed no part of the colonial communi-
ties .... But... they were yet a free and independent peo-
ple ... governed by their own laws.... These Indian Governments were
regarded and treated as foreign Governments ... and their freedom has
constantly been acknowledged, from the time of the first emigration to
the English colonies to the present day .... 2
By contrast, Taney argued, African Americans were "a subordinate
and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant
race... and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the
power and the Government might choose to grant them."'3
The Chief Justice added that because of their earlier status as "free and
independent people," American Indians could become citizens. They were
eligible for citizenship status even though "the course of events has brought
the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States under subjection to
the white race .... ,,4 He wrote:
[T]hey may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Gov-
ernment, be naturalized by the autbority of Congress, and become citi-
zens of a State, and of the United States; and if an individual should
leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the white popula-
tion, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would be-
long to an emigrant from any other foreign people. 5
In the antebellum legal world, it was not clear what the "rights and
privileges" of state citizens would be, since there was no federal civil rights
legislation on the books and no constitutional guidance regarding racial
equality or equal protection. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice believed Indi-
ans could be naturalized and could join the "political community" of the
United States.
It is not hard to pick apart Taney's argument. His assertion that Indian
citizenship could be justified on the basis of the natives' distinctive identity
as "free and independent" people was an obvious overstatement. He noted,
for example, that the courts had considered African Americans "a subordi-
nate and inferior class of beings," but ignored his predecessor John Mar-
shall's statement in Johnson v. McIntosh that Indians could not be
assimilated because they were savages. 6 In most historical instances of
conquest, the Chief Justice had written in 1823, "conquered inhabitants"
were typically "blended with the conquerors, or safely governed as a dis-
2. Id. at 403-04.
3. Id. at 404-05.
4. Id. at 404.
5. Id.
6. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823).
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tinct people .... " This tradition could not be ignored by the conqueror
"without injury to his fame, and hazard to his power." But Marshall
claimed the United States was an exception to this general rule because of
the Indians' savage nature. He wrote,
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages,
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to
leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was
impossible .... 7
Taney appeared to have forgotten this passage.
Taney also argued that state citizenship did not create national citizen-
ship (thereby eliminating this as an argument in favor of Dred Scott's free-
dom), but ignored the fact that there had never been a discussion of Indian
citizenship among federal lawmakers. There was no evidence in 1857 that
anyone but the Chief Justice had entertained the idea that Indians could be
naturalized as citizens of the United States.
While Taney argued that the "words used in that memorable instru-
ment,"8 the Declaration of Independence, were not meant to include blacks
(but did include Indians), he failed to cite that document's explicit descrip-
tion of Indians as "merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare
is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions." 9 The
Chief Justice also cited discriminatory state legislation limiting the rights of
blacks but ignored the laws that discriminated against Indians.' 0 Most re-
markable, Taney noted that even though the first federal naturalization law
limited citizens to "free white persons" and that "[n]o one supposed ... that
any Indian... was capable of enjoying[] the privileges of an American
citizen," that still, in his words, "the word white was not used with any
particular reference to them.""II
Finally, it must be noted that Taney's statements in Dred Scott directly
contradict his holding in United States v. Rogers, decided in 1846, that
Indian tribes were not independent governments with the power to wel-
come new members or operate outside the jurisdiction of the United
States. 12 Rogers arose from the attempted federal criminal prosecution of a
white man who had married into the Cherokee tribe in Indian Territory.
7. Id. at 590.
8. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776).
10. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 412-15, 420. Taney's oversight was most obvious when
he quoted-without comment-anti-miscegenation laws that lumped together Native Americans and
African Americans. Id. at 413.
11. Id. at 419-20.
12. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846).
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William S. Rogers was accused of murder but he claimed U.S. courts had
no jurisdiction over citizens of the Cherokee nation. In his decision uphold-
ing the prosecution of Rogers (delivered several months after Rogers had
died attempting to escape from incarceration in Arkansas) Chief Justice
Taney had declared that "native tribes... have never been acknowledged
or treated as independent nations by the European governments, nor re-
garded as the owners of the territories they respectively occupied."' 13 He
added that the United States had consistently followed this approach:
[F]rom the very moment the general government came into existence to
this time, it has exercised its power over this unfortunate race in the spirit
of humanity and justice, and has endeavored by every means in its power
to enlighten their minds and increase their comforts, and to save them if
possible from the consequences of their own vices. 14
So what was Taney thinking in 1857? Why did he take such pains to
distinguish between Indians and blacks? And why was it so important to
him to preserve the idea that Native Americans could be naturalized citi-
zens even as he took note of the existence of a national racial hierarchy and
accepted the concept of white privilege?
I. THOMAS JEFFERSON, GODFATHF R OF REMOVAL
The first answer is ideological. American political leaders had long
avoided classifying Indians purely in racial terms. This habit grew out of
political and strategic necessity-from the beginning of European settle-
ment, tribal nations wielded diplomatic and military power that demanded
official recognition. 15 The Indians' power was the reason settlers estab-
lished the tradition of making treaties with native groups. Beginning in the
seventeenth century, French, Spanish, and English settlers in every section
of North America had tried to forge legal agreements between their com-
munities and the indigenous peoples they sought to displace. 16 Treaties
were practical instruments for minimizing conflict and, when they included
land sales, tools for acquiring new territory peacefully.
13. Id.
14. Id. This passage is also discussed in DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 45 (1997).
15. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY
VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, at 5,passim (1997).
16. See R. DAVID EDMUNDS, FREDERICK E. HOXIE & NEAL SALISBURY, THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY
OF NATIVE AMERICA 81-107 (2007) (detailing series of wartime treaties signed between Native Ameri-
cans and European forces); DOROTHY V. JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE: COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN
EARLY AMERICA 1-20 (1982) (focusing on disparate expectations with which Europeans and American
Indians viewed binding agreements amongst themselves).
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While the legal and diplomatic tradition of recognizing the Indians'
distinctive political status had a long history, the creation of the United
States-a new, settler state, not an outpost of an imperial power-posed
new problems. How could citizens of this new country square the universal
ideals on which they founded their nation with their obvious desire to dis-
possess the continent's indigenous peoples? How could free men and
women justify the destruction of indigenous societies? Many in the found-
ing generation struggled with this problem, but it was the most imaginative
of them-Thomas Jefferson-who created the ideological formulation that
reconciled the nation's twin commitments to democracy and dispossession.
His scheme shaped early federal Indian policies and ultimately inspired
Taney's thinking and rhetoric.
Jefferson's view of American Indians-like his view of many com-
plex subjects-was both subtle and self-serving. He wrote positively about
the "genius" of Native Americans in Notes on the State of Virginia and
predicted education and "civilization" could raise them to equality with
Europeans. 17 At the same time, Jefferson was fiercely protective of Ameri-
can national interests and willing to take extraordinary measures to defend
the nation's borders. As Anthony Wallace has shown in Jefferson and the
Indians, the third President viewed indigenous people through a tragic lens.
Indians were human beings, but they were fatally backward. 18 They were
eligible for membership in the Republic, but only if they abandoned their
traditional cultures and lifeways. If they refused to renounce their past, they
would inevitably come into conflict with violent frontiersmen or be swin-
dled by unscrupulous traders and clever land speculators. The destruction
that followed would doom them to extinction. Indians were therefore the
inevitable casualties of American expansion. Jefferson's foremost goal,
Wallace concludes, was "to ensure the survival of the United States as a
republic governed by Anglo-Saxon yeomen."' 9
Jefferson reconciled his nationalism and his benevolence by advocat-
ing "civilization" for Indians.20 He argued that by supporting Native educa-
tion and regulating trade with the tribes, the national government would
inevitably foster the evolution of Indian social life in the direction of com-
mercial agriculture and western-style social organization. The President's
17. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 58-64 (William Peden ed., Univ.
of N.C. Press 1954) (1787).
18. See ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, JEFFERSON AND THE INDIANS: THE TRAGIC FATE OF THE FIRST
AMERICANS 1-20 (1999).
19. Id. at 20.
20. See BERNARD W. SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF EXTINCTION: JEFFERSONIAN PHILANTHROPY AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 119-47 (1973).
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theory predicted that tribes who incorporated "civilized" habits-the use of
draft animals by male farmers, domestic labor for women, single-family
residences on privately-owned tracts of land-would eventually abandon
their traditional allegiances and could theoretically become integrated into
settler society. 21 The fact that his theory was not confirmed in practice
underscored both American superiority and, ironically, American human-
ity. The Indians' "failures" proved they could not adapt to progress.
Jefferson summarized his tragic view of Indian-white relations in a
letter to the naturalist Alexander Von Humboldt in December 1813. The
now-former President noted with regret that Indians had thus far refused to
settle alongside American communities and had decided to ally themselves
with the British in the War of 1812. But Jefferson felt little pity for the
tribes' current situation. The government's goal, he wrote, had been
[t]o teach them agriculture and the rudiments of the most necessary arts,
and to encourage industry by establishing among them separate property.
In this way they would have been enabled to subsist and multiply on a
moderate scale of landed possession. They would have mixed their blood
with ours, and been amalgamated and identified with us within no distant
period of time. On the commencement of our present war, we pressed on
them the observance of peace and neutrality, but the interested and un-
principled policy of England has defeated all our labors for the salvation
of these unfortunate people. They have seduced the greater part of the
tribes within our neighborhood, to take up the hatchet against us, and the
cruel massacres they have committed on the women .... 22
In a single paragraph Jefferson endorsed both the intermarriage of In-
dians and whites and the idea that Indians were savages who could be "se-
duced" by foreigners to commit "cruel massacres" on innocent people. This
leap required the former President to ignore not only the Indians' long agri-
cultural traditions and their willingness to negotiate new borders with the
U.S., but also the tribes' strategic interest in an alliance with Great Britain.
This blinkered perspective rested on his faith in a cultural hierarchy that set
the American nation above indigenous peoples.
Jefferson's conception also contained a hard-nosed corollary: when
conditions reached the kind of conflict he described during the War of 1812
and tribes rejected the idea of changing their ways or allying themselves
with "civilized" Americans, the most humane response was for the national
government to force them to leave the United States. Dispossession would
provide recalcitrant or slowly-adapting tribes with safe havens in the West
21. Id. at 125, 141-42.
22. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander Von Humboldt (Dec. 6, 1813), in THOMAs
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1311, 1312 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
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and give them the time to develop their "civilized" skills and keep open the
possibility that they might yet "amalgamate" with the American majority.
While the acquisition of the seemingly-limitless lands of Louisiana
Territory encouraged Jefferson's enthusiasm for this formulation, the most
prominent example of his administration's endorsement of removal came in
1802, the year prior to that event. Georgia, like many other former colo-
nies, had originally been granted a charter that set its western boundary at
the Mississippi. But unlike Virginia and other states to its north, Georgia
had not resolved the question of its western claims by the time Jefferson
took office. The standoff jeopardized national efforts to open new western
lands for settlement, but in Georgia it was politically unpopular for leaders
to surrender their paper claim to the West. Jefferson proposed a compro-
mise: state officials would give up their territorial claims in exchange for a
federal pledge to extinguish the Indian title to lands within the state's mod-
em borders. This unprecedented "Georgia Compact" had no immediate
impact-state officials were content to allow the Indians to remain at pre-
sent in their relatively isolated villages-but it translated Jefferson's corol-
lary into the hard words of a federal statute. 23 Historian Tim Alan Garrison
was correct when he wrote recently that the Georgia Compact marked
"[t]he real seed of the movement that resulted in the wholesale removal of
the Southeastern tribes .... -24
II. TANEY'S POLITICAL ALLIES: CITIZENSHIP AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
REMOVAL
But Taney was not simply echoing Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson pro-
vided the broad framework; his crocodile tears shed over the decline of
Indian tribes inspired other politicians to pose as the Indians' friends who
sought to incorporate Native people into their states as individuals, or, fail-
ing that, to force them move west. The removal era of the 1820s and 1830s
produced a sharper and more effective version of Jefferson's disingenuous-
ness. Confronted by tribes determined to maintain their status as independ-
ent political entities within the boundaries of American states, settler
politicians proposed extending state citizenship to Indians as a way to dis-
solve their allegiance to their tribes while eliminating the federal govern-
23. For a concise narration of events leading to the Georgia Compact and its aftermath, see THEDA
PERDUE & MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE CHEROKEE REMOVAL: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 14-
18 (1995).
24. TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 20 (2002).
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ment's need to enforce its obligations under ratified treaties. 25 Coinciding
with the Chief Justice's arrival on the national scene, the removal era
shaped his specific understanding of Indian eligibility for state citizenship.
His endorsement of citizenship for Indians was not the product of a com-
mitment to racial justice; it was a sign of his allegiance and indebtedness to
the ambitious politicians who in the 1820s and 1830s made Indian re-
moval-the American version of what is today called "ethnic cleansing"-
a national issue.
The greatest proponent of removal, of course, was Andrew Jackson,
the western general and politician who began speaking publicly about the
impracticality of Indian treaties in the immediate aftermath of the War of
1812. Jackson rode to power on his support for American expansion and
settler nationalism. 26 Jackson had long urged the leaders of southeastern
tribes to move west before their lands were overrun by whites, but he ex-
perienced mixed results until 1819.27 In that year, President James Monroe
appointed the Tennessean to serve as a treaty commissioner to negotiate
with the Mississippi Choctaws for the sale of all their eastern lands and
their relocation to Arkansas Territory. 28 Acting on the President's orders,
Jackson wrote directly to the tribe's agent, John McKee, telling him that
this would be the Choctaws' single opportunity to make a deal: "Now is the
time, and the only time, the Government will have it in its power to make
[the Choctaws] happy, by holding the land west of the Mississippi for
them," he declared. "[A]nd this can only be done by their consent to an
exchange, in whole or in part."'29
Meeting four months later, the tribe's leaders rejected Jackson's invi-
tation.30 The Choctaws had long used the woods of modem Arkansas as a
hunting ground, crossing regularly at Nogales, and drew on the territory's
inventory of deerskins to supply their needs. But as familiar as they were
with these western territories, tribal leaders had no interest in leaving Mis-
sissippi. "We wish to remain here," Pushamataha, a chief who had served
25. For a discussion of southern states' definitions of Indian citizenship, see id. at 152, 158, 165,
167-68.
26. See ROBERT V. REMIN1, ANDREw JACKSON & HIS INDIAN WARS 33-34 (2001).
27. See generally id. at 108-79 (recounting Jackson's attempts to convince tribe leaders to move
west).
28. Letter from Andrew Jackson to John McKee (Apr. 22, 1819), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
INDIAN AFFAIRS 229, 229 (1834) [hereinafter INDIAN AFFAIRS].
29. Id. The Choctaw had made one minor land sale to the U.S. in 1816. See Treaty of Cession,
U.S.-Choctaw Nation of Indians, Oct. 24, 1816, 7 Stat. 152.
30. Letter from General Council of the Choctaw Tribe to President Monroe (Aug. 12, 1819), in 2
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 230, 230.
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under Jackson at New Orleans, told the agent. As for selling land in Missis-
sippi he could speak for everyone: "we have none to spare."'31
President Monroe and Secretary of War Calhoun insisted that the tribe
meet with Jackson despite its opposition both to migration and to land
sales.32 And Jackson, despite his determination "never to have any thing to
do again in Indian treaties," agreed to travel south for a face to face meet-
ing.33 When he gathered the Choctaw leaders together in October 1820, at a
spot called Doak's Stand, the general was blunt. Ignoring the tribe's ex-
panding plantations and cattle ranches, he announced, "[Y]ou have more
land than is necessary.... Without a change in your situation, the Choctaw
nation must dwindle to nothing."'34 He added, "the President expects no
difficulty with his Choctaw children.. . ." Jackson presented the tribe with
a choice. Those who wished to travel west "can live in abundance, and
acquire riches and independence.... ." Those who chose to remain would
be "protected by our laws .... As all parties are accommodated," he con-
cluded, "and the interest and happiness of all consulted, there cannot be any
honest opposition made to the friendly proposals of your father the Presi-
dent . . .35
According to the general, the Choctaw tribe could move west; Choc-
taw individuals who wished to live in Mississippi could remain behind.
Since "all parties are accommodated," Jackson insisted there could be no
reasonable objection to the proposal. If the Choctaws rejected it, their deci-
sion would prove that evil influences were at work in the tribe. Echoing
Jefferson's language concerning the Indians' "seduction" by the British a
few years earlier, Jackson asserted that any opposition to his proposal
"must proceed from the false statements of some of the white men and half-
breeds living amongst you."'36 Refusing the government's invitation, he
warned, would mean that the President "can no longer look upon you as
friends and brothers, and as deserving his fatherly protection.... If you
suffer any injury," he concluded darkly, "none but yourselves will be to
blame." 37
31. Id.
32. Letter from J.C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson (May 23, 1820), in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra
note 28, at 230, 230.
33. Letter from Andrew Jackson to J.C. Calhoun (June 19, 1820), in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra
note 28, at 230, 231.
34. Address of Andrew Jackson to the Chiefs and Warriors of the Choctaw Nation (Oct. 10,
1820), in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 235, 236 [hereinafter Jackson's First Address].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 237.
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After the opening session on October 10, the Choctaw chiefs met in
council for a full week, but nothing changed. 38 At the end of that week,
Jackson had had enough. On October 17, the general delivered a second
blistering address to the chiefs, repeating his charge that opposition to a
land sale could only come from "the counsel of bad men," and warning
them Congress had the "right to manage the affairs of this nation. '39 It
would do so, he threatened, "if compelled by the obstinacy of your chiefs
and the wickedness of your advisers."'40 Jackson then delivered his body
blow: if the chiefs refused to cooperate, the government would simply rec-
ognize whatever Choctaws assembled in the West as the tribal government.
This meeting "will be the last time a talk will ever be delivered by your
father the President to his Choctaw children on this side of the Mississippi.
You are advised to beware .... Your father the President will not be trifled
with and put at defiance," he told the group. He ended with a warning:
A heavy cloud may burst upon you, and you may be without friends to
counsel or protect you. The chain which has hitherto united us may be
broken. Listen well, and then determine. Your exis-ence as a nation is in
your own hands.
... Should you reject [the treaty], it will be source of great regret, as
it may be a measure fatal to your nation.41
Jackson would not compromise or retreat. He had no military force at
hand and no authorization from Congress to act, but no one doubted his
ability to back up his words with force. The Hero of New Orleans had set
out Jefferson's formulation as a stark choice: leave as a tribe or remain as
individuals.
For the Choctaws, the drama at Doak's Stand came not only from the
experience of being browbeaten and bribed by a former military ally. More
terrifying even than his threatening posture was Andrew Jackson's eager
grasp of pro-settler rhetoric-the propositions that would soon propel him
to the White House. Jackson's argument was a tougher version of Jeffer-
son's original formulation: Indians were backward hunters who by defini-
tion did not develop their land. Native tribes were therefore anachronistic;
they could not exist within the boundaries of American settlements. "Civi-
38. See Report on Meeting of Commissioners and Choctaw Council (Oct. 14, 1820), in 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 238, 238-39; Report on Meeting of Commissioners and Choctaw Council
(Oct. 15, 1820), in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 239, 239.
39. Address of Andrew Jackson to the Chiefs and Warriors of the Choctaw Nation (Oct. 17,
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lized" Indians who farmed and owned businesses might live as individuals
within new frontier states like Mississippi-provided they obeyed local
laws-but "civilized tribes" by definition did not-and could not-exist.
Eastern tribes like the Choctaws were nothing more than disorganized
groups of Indians, he cried, "straggling about in every direction," whose
minds were inevitably "poisoned by white men and half-breeds living
among them .... ,,42 Federal power might protect tribes in the West, but it
could not do so in the East. Jackson underscored this viewpoint in Article
Four of the Choctaw treaty, a provision which cautioned that the bounda-
ries established around the remaining tribal territory in Mississippi would
remain only "until the period at which said nation shall become so civilized
and enlightened as to be made citizens of the United States .... ,,43
Jackson's hardened version of Jefferson's logic would define the re-
moval era. Historians have focused most of their attention on the Chero-
kees and their heroic struggle to resist Georgia's determination to expel
them from the state, but the principal legal and political arguments were
laid out by Jackson and his Choctaw adversaries in 1820. 44 Writing at the
conclusion of his meeting at Doak's Stand the future President predicted-
based on "the information which has reached us since the treaty was
signed"-that "at least two-thirds of the nation here will remove to the
country ceded to them" and "[t]he remainder ... will then be prepared to
have the laws of the United States extended over them. . . ." He added, "we
shall no longer witness the farce and absurdity of holding treaties with the
Indians residing within our territorial limits. '45
Citizenship, then, was introduced into discussions of Indian affairs
both as a way of fulfilling Thomas Jefferson's original formulation exclud-
ing Native tribes from the American state and as an instrument to force
tribes to leave the East and settle beyond the boundaries of the states in the
West. During the 1820s, as the debate over removal spread across Georgia,
42. These phrases are from Jackson's first speech to the tribe and from his report on the treaty
council. Jackson's First Address, supra note 34, at 236; Report to the U.S. Secretary of War on the
Choctaw Treaty Council (Oct. 21, 1820), in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 241, 242 [hereinafter
Report to the U.S. Secretary of War]. It is irresistible to note that one of the principal "malcontents" at
Doaks Stand was Pooshamataha, the second chief to sign the treaty, and that "mixed bloods" such as
Edmund Folsom and James Pichlynn received "donations" and approved the final agreement.
43. A Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Accomodation, U.S.-Choctaw Nation of Indians, art. 4,
Oct. 18, 1820, 7 Stat. 210, 211.
44. See GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES
OF INDIANS 19-30 (2d ed. 1953) (discussing the arguments in the context of a later treaty with the
Choctaws, the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek).
45. Report to the U.S. Secretary of War, supra note 42, at 243.
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Alabama, and Mississippi, local politicians turned repeatedly to state citi-
zenship as a tool for forcing removal. 46
The tribes fought back by invoking the government's obligations un-
der the treaties it had signed over the previous quarter century and by pro-
posing an alternative to Jefferson's and Jackson's idea that Indians must
exist either as tribes in the West, outside the boundaries of the states, or as
individual citizens inside the boundaries of the states. The Cherokees, for
example, published a memorial to Congress in the midst of the 1824 presi-
dential contest which outlined a third path for tribes to follow. The "Chero-
kee nation" submitted a rebuttal to Georgia's politicians which contained
the declaration that the tribe "ha[d] turned [its] attention to the pursuits of
the civilized man .... ',47 For the Cherokees, this commitment did not re-
quire them to dissolve their tribal government. In fact, the memorial de-
clared that the tribe as a collective was "peacefully endeavoring to enjoy
the blessings of civilization and Christianity," and that it expected the fed-
eral authorities to support its effort.48 The United States was obligated to
extend this protection, the memorial added, both because of its treaty com-
mitments and because the Cherokees-as civilized people-asserted their
rights "under that memorable declaration 'that all men are created
equal' . . . ."49 Here was a "civilized" tribe seeking to remain in the East to
pursue "the blessings of civilization."
The Choctaws issued a similar declaration the following year. 50 The
"one great reason" for the Americans' success, a tribal delegation to Wash-
ington wrote, "has been the general diffusion of literature and the arts of
civilized life among them." 51 Far from opposing "civilization," these lead-
ers embraced it and argued that the principals of American democracy
should lead the United States to respect the rights of tribes:
You have institutions to promote and disseminate the knowledge of
every branch of science; you have a government, and you have laws, all
founded upon those principles of liberty and equality which have ever
been dear to us .... The theory of your government is[] justice and good
46. See, e.g., FOREMAN, supra note 44, at 102-03 (describing mixed results from attempts to
remove Choctaws who had become citizens of Mississippi); id. at 183-90 (focusing on removal of the
Creeks to the West by local authorities in violation of the government's promise to care for Creek
families while some served in the army). State jurisdiction is also a central theme in the conclusions of
GARRISON, supra note 24, at 234-39.
47. Indian Lands in Georgia, NILES WKLY. REG., May 1, 1824, at 139.
48. Id.
49. Id. The surprising outcome of the "civilization" effort-more, rather than less attachment to
tribal traditions-is also discussed in GARRISON, supra note 24, at 33.
50. Memorial from Choctaw Representatives to the U.S. Congress (Feb. 18, 1825), in THOMAS L.
MCKENNEY, 2 MEMOIRS: OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL 120 (New York, Paine & Burgess 1846).
51. Id. at 121.
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faith to all men. You will not submit to injury from one party because it
is powerful, nor will you oppress another because it is weak. Impressed
with that persuasion, we are confident that our rights will be respected. 52
American government and law-the visible symbols of the Ameri-
cans' commitment to liberty and equality-would prevent greedy settlers
and politicians from oppressing the weak tribes living within the borders of
the eastern states.53 The leaders of one of the largest tribes in the nation
were staking their future on the proposition that there was a place for their
group to exist within the "civilized" institutions of the United States. They
were calling for the creation of a substitute for Jefferson's and Jackson's
formulations. They sought a new political culture, both for themselves and
for other tribes who reached similar conclusions about the American nation
and its future potential.
In the Southeast, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi rejected these
proposals, insisting instead on the stark choice of state citizenship or re-
moval. And they won. Georgia extended its laws over Cherokee lands in
1828; a decade later the Cherokees were gone-even though their removal
treaty declared them to be state citizens. 54 Mississippi unilaterally extended
its laws over the Choctaws and Chickasaws in January of 1830.55 Within
two years removal treaties had been signed with both tribes.56 Alabama
extended its laws over the Creeks in 1832; within months removal was
underway there. 57 Taney's invocation of state citizenship, then, was consis-
tent with this removal-era formulation. Indians would have no place within
the boundaries of the United States except as individuals, and Congress
would have no obligation to enforce Indian treaty rights on behalf of people
who, in Jackson's phrase, had "the laws of the United States extended over
them."'58 This failure was acutely evident in Mississippi and Alabama
where tribal members were allowed to select individual homesteads on
former tribal lands and operate them as family farms. These new state citi-
52. Id.
53. See id. at 121-22.
54. See Treaty of Dec. 29, 1835, U.S.-Cherokee tribe of Indians, art. 12, 7 Stat 478, 483; see also
PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 23, at 17-18.
55. See A Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession and Limits, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, pmbl., Sept.
27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, 333 (acknowledging that the "State of Mississippi ha[d] extended the laws of said
State to persons and property within the chartered limits of the same .... ).
56. The Choctaw Treaty explicitly declared that Indians who remained in the state would become
citizens. Id. at art. XIV, 7 Stat. at 335.
57. Treaty of Mar. 24, 1832, U.S.-Creek tribe of Indians, 7 Stat. 366, reprinted in NILES WKLY.
REG., Apr. 14, 1832, at 116; see also The Creek Indians, NILES WKLY. REG., May 16, 1829, at 182.
58. Report to the U.S. Secretary of War, supra note 42, at 243. For a summary of these actions,
see MARY ELIZABETH YOUNG, REDSKINS, RUFFLESHIRTS, AND REDNECKS: INDIAN ALLOTMENTS IN
ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI 1830-1860, at 14-16, 29, 38 (1961).
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zens rapidly became the victims of land enterprising merchants and land
speculators. 59
Constitutionally, in the antebellum era there was no federal power to
enforce a set of rights that all Indians might enjoy. Mississippi had the most
liberal definition of Indian citizenship, allowing Natives to testify in court
and serve on juries, but it continued to limit the privilege of voting to white
men. Alabama and Georgia did not allow Indians to testify in court, even
though legislation in both states allowed Native people to be sued for debt.
No states sought to protect Indians within their boundaries from speculators
or unscrupulous merchants who descended on the tribes with offers to lease
or purchase their lands. "Once the contract was signed," historian Mary
Young declared, "what he 'chose' to do... was his own business... Once
this big lie was signed and sealed into the supreme law of the land, no ef-
fort on the part of the government to secure the proper execution of its
promises could avail. ''60
A similar, if less dramatic, pairing of individual "rights" and a descent
into poverty occurred in the Midwest when Indians who refused to move
west opted for individual plots of land. During the decade of the Dred Scott
decision, treaties dividing tribal landholdings into individual plots of land
and making Indians subject to state jurisdiction were signed by the Miamis,
Winnebagos, Ottawas and Chippewas of Michigan, the Stockbridge-
Munsees of Wisconsin, and the Kansas. 61 The exact legal experience of
these tribes remains largely unstudied, but none of these cases prompted
federal supervision of state authorities or a clear enunciation of the rights of
Native Americans under state law.
Taney's references to Indian citizenship in Dred Scott, therefore,
should not be taken as an endorsement of the racial equality of Native
Americans and whites. They should be viewed instead as the statements of
a Jacksonian Democrat who employed the language of Indian competence
to justify the dismantling of tribal governments and the acquisition of tribal
lands. If Indians could be citizens, they should not belong to tribes. Citizen-
ship in a republic was superior to affiliation with an Indian tribe. Tribes by
definition were uncivilized and backward. By becoming citizens, and com-
59. YOUNG, supra note 58, at 45-46.
60. Id. at 45.
61. See Treaty with the Miami Indians, U.S.-Miami tribe of Indians, June 5, 1854, 10 Stat. 1093;
Treaty with the Winnebagoes, U.S.-Winnebago tribe of Indians, Feb. 27, 1855, 10 Stat. 1172; Treaty
with the Ottowas and Chippewas, U.S.-Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, July 31, 1855, 11 Stat. 621;
Treaty with the Stockbridges and Munsees, U.S.-Stockbridge and Munsee tribes of Indians, Feb. 5,
1856, 11 Stat. 663; Treaty with the Kansas Tribe of Indians, U.S.-Kansas tribe of Indians, Oct. 5, 1859,
12 Stat. 1111.
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ing under the jurisdiction of the states, Indians would enter Jefferson's
imaginary process of education and uplift, a process that would produce
either "amalgamation" or-more likely-the transfer of their property to
white ownership and the quiet extermination of their communities.
For whites to maintain their faith in the ideals of their settler state, it
was crucial that individual Indians living within state boundaries not be
defined as backward savages. To define them that way would be to justify
continued federal supervision of relations with the tribes, more treaties, and
more intrusion into state politics. If Indians living within the borders of
states were indeed "dependent nations," as John Marshall had famously
declared, then they would need continuing support and federal protection.62
But if they were potential citizens, national benevolence could be expressed
by ignoring both tribes and treaties and by extending the laws of the states
over their individual members. From the perspective of white politicians
and white settlers on Indian lands, it was far better to define Native Ameri-
cans as potential citizens, ready for state jurisdiction, and capable of entry
into the expanding American nation, than it was to recognize their legal
status as tribes. This was the source of the "big lie" white people told them-
selves about Indians then-and to a large extent it is the big lie Americans
continue to tell themselves about Indians today. Ignoring tribes and defin-
ing Indians as nothing other than potential citizens erases their separate and
distinctive political identity and cancels the nation's treaty obligations to
tribes.
Politicians like Jackson and his allies embraced the idea of Indian citi-
zenship because they were confident of what would happen once Indians
became state citizens-in the absence of federal guardianship, they would
rapidly be victimized by more powerful whites-and because extending
state laws over Indians provided an alternative to recognizing the existence
of communities of people who, like the Cherokees, were both politically
distinct and had turned their attention "to the pursuits of civilized man."
The ideology undergirding the American settler state and its policy of In-
dian dispossession required that the United States be the only entity
deemed capable of "civilization."
62. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 534 (1832) (finding unconstitutional a Georgia law that interfered with the administration
of federal treaties with Indian tribes designed to educate and civilize the tribes).
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III. WHAT WERE THE INDIANS THINKING?
Taney's statements help clarify the Supreme Court's definitions of In-
dian rights in 1857, but they can also help illuminate the actions of tribal
leaders during this same, tumultuous era. How did this language of citizen-
ship, and the "big lie" of officials who welcomed Indian citizenship while
happily witnessing tribal dispossession, affect indigenous leaders who were
trying to chart a legal and political strategy for their communities' future?
If Taney offers a window onto the deceptive and complex language of In-
dian rights in the 1850s, what else can we see through that opening?
We can begin to answer this broad question by examining the life of a
remarkable individual, one of the most articulate leaders among the Indians
who read Justice Taney's 1857 decision, the Cherokee lawyer, William
Potter Ross. Born near modem Chattanooga, Tennessee, in the summer of
1820, Ross came of age during the removal crisis and belonged to the gen-
eration of tribal leaders who tried to maneuver through the rapidly shifting
legal and political environment of the 1850s and 1860s.63 William Potter
belonged to the extended Ross family that provided John Ross and other
leaders of the Cherokees' campaign to remain in Georgia. William's father,
John Golden Ross, was born in Scotland but his mother Eliza-who shared
the same last name as her husband but was not related to him-was the
sister of Chief John Ross.64 Thanks to his stellar academic record compiled
at the Presbyterian mission school in Will's Valley, Alabama, and
Greenville Academy in Tennessee, together with the support of his famous
uncle, William Potter left Tennessee in 1837 to attend Hamil's Preparatory
School in Lawrenceville, New Jersey. 65 He entered Princeton University a
year later and graduated in 1842. Ross was in the East throughout the re-
moval crisis; he retraced his parents grueling journey west on the "Trail of
Tears" by carriage during the summer following his college graduation.66
Despite his relatively comfortable journey west in 1842, William Pot-
ter could not escape the trauma echoing through his community. As a
teacher in a rural school in the fall of 1842, he witnessed the Cherokees'
struggle to farm their new lands and to reorganize their tribal govern-
63. For a narrative of tribal politics in these decades, see generally WILLIAM G. McLOUGHL1N,
AFTER THE TRAIL OF TEARS: THE CHEROKEES' STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, 1839-1880, at 59-175
(1993).
64. WILLIAM P. ROSS, Biography of Hon. William P. Ross, in THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HON.
WILLIAM P. RoSS (Fort Smith, Weldon & Williams 1893).
65. John Bartlett Meserve, Chief William Potter Ross, 15 CHRONS. OKLA. 21, 23 (1937).
66. Id.
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ment.67 He was not directly involved in the murders of Major Ridge and
other leaders of the minority who signed the Treaty of New Echota in 1835
(the agreement that authorized the tribe's removal to the West), nor was he
a target of the retaliatory violence organized by Ridge's relatives during the
ensuing decade, but these conflicts swirled around him. After a year in the
classroom, William Potter moved to the new Cherokee capital, Tahlequah,
and joined the many relatives active in tribal government. He secured a
position as clerk of the national senate, and in 1844, the legislature ap-
pointed him the first editor of the tribal newspaper, The Advocate.68
William Potter certainly witnessed the distrust and fear that infected
Cherokee life during the undeclared tribal civil war of the 1840s. During
that decade he moved to the commercial center of Fort Gibson, became a
merchant and, later, a lawyer. While an active ally of his uncle, William
Potter appears to have avoided partisanship. He remained largely neutral as
the tribal divisions of the 1830s morphed into debates over slavery and
secession. 69 Ross is a fascinating counterpoint to Justice Taney because he
represents the Indian intellectuals who struggled to respond both to the
trauma of removal and the intellectual challenge of the legal decisions that
helped set it in motion. Ross recognized that the Cherokees could not es-
cape the power of the United States.70 He knew that neither the courts nor
the politicians would accept Indian communities as the equivalent of for-
eign nations, but he also knew that Indian communities could not survive if
their only alternative to their tribal existence was forced state citizenship.
Ross, more than we, understood what Taney was thinking. What was his
response?
The resettled nations in Indian Territory shared both the human
trauma of dispossession and the political legacy of the removal struggle.
They had fought their expulsions before the public and in court by insisting
that the settlers who now called themselves "Americans" recognize the
obligations they had incurred by negotiating treaties with indigenous peo-
ples.71 They also believed that these treaty obligations formed the basis for
a set of tribal "rights," enforceable against the national government. 72 As
67. See 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 271-79 (1984).
68. Meserve, supra note 65, at 23-24.
69. Id. at 24-25.
70. See id. at 25-26.
71. The tribes and their allies made this case most eloquently in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2-14 (1831).
72. For a summary of the humanitarians' defense of treaty rights during the early 1830s, see 1
PRUCHA, supra note 67, at 200-06.
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they founded new governments in the West, they pursued these ideas and
sought to anchor the rights of tribes in the treaties and statutes that estab-
lished their new governments in Indian Territory. The removed tribes in-
sisted on treaties, tribal charters, and letters of understanding with federal
officials. They were also quick to pursue suits in the Court of Claims for
damages to their property incurred during their move west.7 3
Other Indian people shared similar experiences in other parts of North
America, but the southeastern tribes shared a unique status: they had no
ancestral claim to their new homelands. Their sovereignty was now com-
pletely dependent on the commitment of the United States, embodied in a
series of laws, treaty agreements, and other written understandings. 74 Re-
moval created an archipelago of legal islands in the center of North Amer-
ica, each inhabited by a distinct indigenous group. There was therefore a
striking disjuncture between the resettled eastern tribes dependent on
American legal guarantees and their new indigenous neighbors.
The resettled nations in Indian Territory relied on treaties to guarantee
their existence, but they shared a continent with Navajos living beyond the
authority of federal agents, Lakotas migrating rapidly into the Yellowstone
valley, Catholic Flatheads trading with Hudson's Bay men in the northern
Rockies, and Paiute bands adjusting to the ecological disruption caused by
Americans crossing the Great Basin.75 Erroneously labeled "civilized" by
outsiders, the resettled groups were not junior versions of the white com-
munities that had surrounded them in the East. Nor, despite their mission-
ary advisors, schools, and courts, did they represent Native versions of
American Christian civilization. Indeed, their governments were not the
only markers of their distinctive tribal identities. Their social systems,
economies, and religious institutions also represented something new and
unprecedented. They were not purely "Indian" or "white" or "Cherokee" or
"Choctaw," yet in a sense they were all--or many-of these things as well.
In sociologist Paul Gilroy's terms, they were products of "the processes of
cultural mutation and restless (dis)continuity that exceed racial discourse
and avoid capture by its agents. '76
73. For a discussion of the tribes' desire to prosecute claims, see Harvey D. Rosenthal, Indian
Claims and the American Conscience: A Brief History of the Indian Claims Commission, in
IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 35 (Imre Sutton ed., 1985).
74. The dependency of tribes on the sovereignty of the United States was spelled out in Rogers v.
Cherokee Nation (United States v. Rogers), 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846), a decision's whose conse-
quences are discussed in McLOUGHLIN, supra note 63, at 106-07.
75. See generally EDMUNDS, HOXIE & SALISBURY, supra note 16, at 241-66 (discussing tribes
native to the West and the impact migrating populations had on western tribes).
76. PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC: MODERNITY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 2 (1993).
[Vol 82:329
WHAT WAS TANEY THINKING?
Because William Potter Ross's world exceeded the "racial discourse"
that conventionally applied to Native Americans (and that was exemplified
in Taney's pronouncements), it is important to frame his life in a way that
allows him to "avoid capture" by those who want simply to tell the story of
defeat and dispossession. The destruction of the Cherokee Nation--or at
least the catastrophe that rendered it invisible for most of the twentieth
century-surely occurred, but it did not define the significance of William
Potter's life. His significance arises from his role as an originator and
communicator of ideas that suggested a way forward for tribes, and not by
his quixotic resistance of the expanding American settler state. From this
perspective, Ross was centrally engaged with "cultural mutations" in In-
dian Territory that had a profound impact on Native peoples for decades
after his death. These "mutations" emerged from three separate, but related,
arenas.
First, William Potter Ross was an early advocate of cooperation
among the Indian Territory tribes. As a newspaper editor in the 1840s, he
reported regularly on councils held by Cherokees and neighboring groups
to discuss matters of common concern.77 He helped maintain that tradition
after the Civil War when, as Principal Chief in 1866, he used "Grand
Councils" to rally support among neighboring tribes and present a more
powerful voice in Congress. In the fall of 1870 he led the Cherokee delega-
tion to the Ockmulgee Convention that passed a series of resolutions
opposing the extension of American jurisdiction over Indian Territory. 78
William Potter was the principal author of a Native constitution to bring
about an autonomous Indian-run territory within the United States. The
Cherokee Advocate praised his efforts, noting that the constitution would
"secure our protection in what we already have and ... obtain from the
Government, what is justly due us." Such a path, the paper noted, "involv-
ing as it does our duty and obligations to the Government, supported by the
moral force of humanity, justice and the Christian religion, is... the only
successful one available to US." ' 7 9
Second, Ross was a fierce defender of treaties, contributing substan-
tially to the idea that the privileges conveyed in these agreements should be
properly understood as "rights" sanctioned by the U.S. Constitution. 80
These rights could range from personal freedoms to the privilege of con-
77. See, e.g., Nebraska Territory, CHEROKEE ADVOC., Apr. 24, 1845, at 3 (on Nebraska Terri-
tory); Indian Council, CHEROKEE ADvoc., May 8, 1845, at 3 (on an intertribal council).
78. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 63, at 274-75.
79. CHEROKEE ADVOC., Oct. 22, 1870, at 1.
80. The Cherokees' views on treaty rights were written into the Treaty of 1868, which the U.S.
Senate refused to ratify. See McLOUGHLIN, supra note 63, at 247-50.
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ducting tribal affairs without federal interference. Ross's most famous ef-
fort in this connection was his leadership during the campaign to win fed-
eral recognition for tax-exempt businesses based in Indian Territory. That
exemption had been written into the tribe's 1866 treaty with the United
States-a treaty Ross had helped negotiate-but was undermined by a new
revenue statute that the federal government attempted to apply to a Chero-
kee tobacco producer. 81 The Supreme Court heard the Cherokees' appeal in
1870 but refused to recognize power of the treaty's language. It declared
instead that the tax law could cancel the guarantees contained in a formal
treaty. 82 The Cherokee Advocate responded angrily to the decision, point-
ing out-correctly-that
[i]t imperils ... all our rights. It commits us wholly to the "political de-
partment" of the government, and places us entirely at its mercy. In our
ignorance we have supposed that Treaties were contracts entered into
under the most solemn forms, and the most sacred pledges of human
faith, and that they could be abrogated only by mutual consent. We are
now taught differently. 83
In their struggle to defend treaty rights, Ross had pressed for a definition of
tribal sovereignty within the United States. And despite the Cherokees'
defeat in the courts, he had devised a powerful critique of the rapidly-
consolidating American state and sketched out a vision of governmental
pluralism others would draw upon in the future.
Finally, William Potter Ross articulated the benefits of citizenship in a
modern Indian tribe functioning within the boundaries of the American
nation. During the 1870s and 1880s, critics of tribal governments in Indian
Territory and supporters of the non-Indian settlers eager to claim "undevel-
oped" lands there argued that the Native nations were lawless and chaotic
and that their tradition of communal land ownership was backward and
impractical. 84 Whether fueled by racism or fear, these critics could not
imagine that Choctaws or Cherokees could police their own communities
or that tribal institutions could prosper in a modern economy. Ross de-
fended tribal governments as defenders of law and order and tribal tradi-
tions as equally worthy of existence in a modern setting. He also pointed
81. Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, U.S.-Cherokee nation of Indians, art. X, July 19, 1866, 14
Stat. 799, 801; see also Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 107, 15 Stat. 125, 167.
82. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871). For a concise summary of the
controversy, see MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 63, at 265-67.
83. James Shelton, The Indians Address to Congress-They Humbly Beg for Justice and Fair
Treatment-Memorial of the Grand Council of June 1871, CHEROKEE ADVOC., July 8, 1871, at 2.
84. See FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS,
1880-1920, at 1-39 (1984) (discussing critics' and expansionists' desire to assimilate the Indians, so as
to "civilize" the tribes and to prevent them from "usurping" large tracts of land).
[Vol 82:329
WHAT WAS TANEY THINKING?
out that tribal control over community resources could provide for the
common welfare at least as well as individual landownership and unfet-
tered capitalism. 85 He wrote in an 1844 editorial, for example, that
from time immemorial the original Domain of the Cherokees was held
by the Nation .... No individual or number of individuals were allowed
to control the cession or the acquisition of territory. This power was ever
regarded as the sacred and inalienable right of the Nation in its Sover-
eign capacity.86
In William Potter's view, tribal citizenship embodied something both sa-
cred and modem; it did not only protect the customs of the past.
William Potter Ross's ideas allow us to trace a trajectory of political
thinking from the Southeast to Indian Territory. His life offers a lens
through which we may view the post-removal history of the political cul-
tures created during the removal crisis. It illuminates the political culture of
the people often labeled the "Five Civilized Tribes" while making clear
how far from the American standard of "civilization" these communities
remained. His achievements as a newspaper editor, lawyer, and political
leader do not necessarily mean that his goal was to be assimilated into the
American majority society. Far from it. Instead, they sketch the outlines of
a life that reflects the "discontinuous," hybrid Native culture that responded
to the formulations of Jefferson and Taney.
In the Cherokee Tobacco case, the Supreme Court followed in the
footsteps of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson by recognizing Indians
in "tribes" as having nothing but a "savage" identity. 87 At the same time,
congressmen and senators debating the future of Indian Territory could
only imagine culturally-distinct Native communities as artifacts of the past
who had no significant role to play in a modem United States. Both sets of
assumptions represented what sociologist David Theo Golberg has called
the process of "sew[ing] ... modem social exclusions into the seams of the
social fabric .... ,,88 Goldberg argues that the culmination of this needle-
work is modem nations that are nothing more than a "racial state," political
entities that have transformed racial and cultural hierarchies into a national
85. See William P. Ross, Address to the Cherokee Council, in THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HON.
WILLIAM P. ROSS, supra note 64, at 1; William P. Ross, Report to the General Council on Agriculture,
in THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HON. WILLIAM P. Ross, supra note 64, at 7; William P. Ross, Argument
Delivered Feb. 1, 1872, in THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROSS, supra note 64, at 10;
William P. Ross, Argument Delivered Mar. 5, 1872, in THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HON. WILLIAM P.
ROSS, supra note 64, at 29.
86. William P. Ross, The Correspondence, CHEROKEE ADVOC., Nov. 28, 1844, at 2.
87. See Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 616 (holding that laws enacted by Congress may
supersede treaties made with tribes and, therefore, may be enforced against members of the tribes).
88. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, THE RACIAL STATE 10 (2002).
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ideology.89 Ross's career spanned the decades when the United States (led
by Taney and others) followed this pathway to becoming a racial state.
Defending slavery while simultaneously canceling its treaty obligations to
Indians, nineteenth-century Americans established the institutions and laws
that allowed twentieth-century commentators to call their nation, "A White
Man's Country." 90
It is ironic that William Potter Ross, member of a Cherokee slave-
owning family and a veteran of service in the Confederate cause, should be
remembered as an opponent of the rapidly-consolidating American racial
state. But his steady opposition to national authority in Indian Territory,
and his careful defense of tribal rights and tribal citizenship, were mounted
to oppose a nationalist campaign of social exclusion aimed at canceling the
nation's moral and legal commitments to Native people. Cherokees like
William Potter may have shared a belief in African American inferiority
with whites, but he did not share their faith in white supremacy or their
goal of creating a culturally homogeneous nation. Ross was an advocate of
political pluralism. Unlike Taney, he conceived of a national community
capable of containing both treaties and tribes. Even though the forces of
American nationalism defeated him in his lifetime, his conceptual vision
would prove to have a life of its own.
IV. Ross's STRATEGY IN THE ERA OF DRED SCOIT
The removal era was a time of multiple promises as well as extensive
suffering. The expulsion of the Choctaws, Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws,
and Seminoles-patronizingly called both then and now the "Five Civilized
Tribes"-from the Southeast brought forth scenes of hardship and disloca-
tion: frozen bodies buried alongside the gruesome "Trail of Tears," con-
fused families herded onto steamboats bound for the unknown, and terrified
men and women hunted down by soldiers across the Appalachians and as
far south as the swamps of Florida.9 1 But mixed with these horrors were
repeated pledges from federal authorities that once their relocation was
complete, Native people could look forward to a life of peace and quiet.92
Andrew Jackson himself had declared in his first inaugural address that the
tribes that agreed to removal would live on lands "guaranteed" to them and
would "be secured in the enjoyments of governments of their own choice,
89. See id. at 34.
90. This theme is a central focus of ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE
REPUBLIC: CLASS POLITICS AND MASS CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990).
91. See EDMUNDS, HOXIE& SALISBURY, supra note 16, at 222-30.
92. See I PRUCHA, supra note 67, at 195-200.
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subject to no other control from the United States than such as may be nec-
essary to preserve peace on the frontier .... 9,93
William P. Ross, who had followed the removal controversy carefully
while completing his studies at Princeton, would have been acutely sensi-
tive to any change in the government's view of tribal autonomy once the
Cherokees were relocated to the West. He would have shared his famous
uncle's disappointment when, on arriving in Washington in the spring of
1840, he learned that the Indian Office-still led by Andrew Jackson's
appointees-had already met with representatives of two minority groups
within the tribe: the "Old Settlers," (tribesmen who had emigrated voluntar-
ily over the previous two decades) and the Cherokee "Treaty Party" (repre-
sentatives of the minority who had signed the 1835 Treaty of New Echota
authorizing removal). 94 To be sure, the Cherokees at this moment were
deeply divided, but Ross represented the largest group within the tribe and
his cooperation had enabled the United States to carry out the tribe's re-
moval with a minimum of conflict.95 But Secretary of War Joel Poinsett
told Ross the United States no longer recognized him as the tribe's leader.
Moreover, officials at the Indian Office told Ross any future agreement
would require that he make concessions to his rivals and acknowledge the
legitimacy of the fraudulent New Echota agreement. The Chief told his
congressional supporters that the administration had laid a "scheme... to
denationalize us .... ,,96
For the next six years, while William Potter completed his studies,
traveled to his new home in Oklahoma, and began work as a frontier school
teacher, John Ross struggled with federal authorities over the terms of the
Cherokees' tribal status in the West. The chief did not agree to a new treaty
until the summer of 1846 when, pressured by President Polk and politicians
now concerned more with the imminent Mexican War than justice for
Ross's followers, Ross gave up and agreed to the terms of the 1835 treaty,
including its $5 million price tag for the tribe's Georgia lands.97 Not only
did this retreat force Ross and his allies to accept a document they had long
93. Muriel H. Wright, The Removal of the Choctaws to the Indian Territory 1830-1833, 6
CHRONS. OKLA. 103, 103 (1928) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Andrew Jackson); see also
GARRISON, supra note 24, at 103-04.
94. See McLOUGHLIN, supra note 63, at 27-28.
95. See id. at 4-5 (discussing the division among the Cherokees).
96. Id. at 28 (internal quotations omitted).
97. Treaty of Dee. 29, 1835, U.S.-Cherokee tribe of Indians, art. 1, 7 Stat 478, 479 [hereinafter
1835 Cherokee Treaty]. Adding insult to injury, the costs incurred transporting the tribe to Oklahoma
were deducted from the total payment. See Treaty of August 6, 1846, U.S.-Cherokee tribe of Indians,
art. 1, 9 Stat. 871, art III [hereinafter 1846 Cherokee Treaty] (acknowledging that the costs of spolia-
tions and dispossessed property were subtracted from the $5 million).
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abhorred, but it meant the new Cherokee government would have far less
financial support than it needed. The new treaty compensated Ross for his
concessions by promising that a patent would be issued for the tribal terri-
tory and reiterating the government's pledge to "forever secure and guaran-
tee" their country to them.98 On the surface, there was nothing directly
objectionable in the terms of the 1846 agreement, but the delay in reaching
it, and the obvious enjoyment Indian Office personnel derived from under-
cutting and frustrating the powerful Cherokee leader, made it clear to all
Cherokees that federal authorities in the 1840s were less enthusiastic about
tribal autonomy in the West than they had been a decade earlier.
William Potter witnessed a second modification of pre-removal under-
standings in 1846 when Chief Justice Roger Taney announced the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Rogers. Ross was also now in a posi-
tion to comment directly on the case as his uncle had named him editor of
the new tribal newspaper, the Cherokee Advocate, in 1844. 99 The Rogers
case involved a white man who had sought to overturn his murder convic-
tion in federal court by asserting that as a citizen of the Cherokee Nation
since 1836, he was beyond the jurisdiction of the American justice system.
Rogers seemed to have a solid argument. His victim, Jacob Nicholson, was
also an adopted Cherokee and the Treaty of 1835 expressly recognized the
tribe's right "to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem
necessary for the government and protection of the persons and property
within their own country... or such persons as have connected themselves
with them .... "100 But Taney rejected that treaty pledge, noting that "from
the very moment the general government came into existence.., it has
exercised its power over this unfortunate race in the spirit of humanity and
justice, and has endeavored. . . to enlighten their minds and... to save
them if possible from the consequences of their own vices." 101 In a sense,
Taney wrote, all federal obligations were humanitarian and therefore vol-
untary.
Taney recognized that the criminal statutes governing federal territo-
ries specifically exempted crimes committed "by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian," but the Chief Justice could not ac-
cept a political definition of the Cherokee tribe. He wrote, "a white man
who at mature age is adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an
98. 1846 Cherokee Treaty, supra note 97, art. I, 9 Stat. at 871.
99. Meserve, supra note 65, at 23-24.
100. 1835 Cherokee Treaty, supra note 97, art. 5, 7 Stat. at 481.
101. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846).
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Indian... ,,02 Despite Andrew Jackson's pledge that tribes like the
Cherokees would be "secured in the enjoyments of governments of their
own choice," Taney declared William Rogers could not renounce his racial
identity: "Whatever obligations the prisoner may have taken upon himself
by becoming a Cherokee by adoption, his responsibility to the laws of the
United States remained unchanged and undiminished. He was still a white
man, of the white race, and therefore not within the exception in the act of
Congress."'103 And whatever guarantees had been promised the Cherokees,
membership in their group was still a function of race, not political affilia-
tion.
William Potter Ross responded to Rogers and the 1846 treaty with an
editorial published in the Advocate in August of that year. 104 The unsettled
atmosphere of the 1840s-marked for young Cherokees like William Potter
Ross by the shortcomings of the 1846 treaty and the explicit racism of Jus-
tice Taney's ruling-likely contributed to the expansion of a new phe-
nomenon that was widely discussed in the columns of his newspaper. This
new activity was the participation of Cherokees and other resettled tribes in
multi-tribal conferences aimed at promoting peaceful relations among the
region's tribes. The young editor of the Advocate was particularly enthusi-
astic about these meetings.
The meetings likely originated in efforts to mediate disputes over land.
Reports of conflicts between eastern tribes and groups native to the area
such as the Osages had circulated in the East prior to the mass removals of
the 1830s, and the Cherokees and others were eager to smooth over these
disputes. 105 The eastern tribes also arrived in Oklahoma at the same time as
the new Republic of Texas was establishing its borders and initiating its
own campaign of removal. 106 At the same time, Mexican officials to the
south and west-still resentful of the Texans recent success in their war of
independence-worked to form alliances with Comanches and other
groups willing to raid and harass the new nation's frontier. 107 Finally, reset-
tled tribes from the American Midwest-Miamis, Ottawas, Kickapoos,
Potawatomis, and Shawnees-were making new homes in the area north of
Indian Territory just as the southeastern tribes arrived. 108 The disruptions in
102. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
103. Id. at 573.
104. William P. Ross, The Right of Self-Government, CHEROKEE ADVOC., Aug. 27, 1846.
105. For background on these conflicts, see EDMUNDS, HOXIE & SALISBURY, supra note 16, at
241-46.
106. See id. at 250-53.
107. Id. at 253.
108. See id. at 231-33.
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Kansas and Missouri triggered yet another round of retaliation and resent-
ment among indigenous groups such as the Pawnees, Wichitas, and Kio-
was. 109
In addition to the local pressures that encouraged better relations with
surrounding tribes, William Potter Ross and his colleagues were probably
inspired by the story of Sequoyah, the tribal elder who had first produced a
written version of the Cherokee language. Sequoyah had settled voluntarily
in the West in the 1820s, and in 1828 had joined a tribal delegation that
traveled to Washington, D.C., on official business. 1 0 While in the Ameri-
can capital, the Cherokee leader met a number of representatives from
other tribes and became taken with the idea of bringing literacy to all Na-
tive people. Sequoyah returned to Oklahoma determined to compile a uni-
versal alphabet that could be used by all the tribes. To accomplish this goal,
he set out with an ox cart to visit tribes in Oklahoma and across the South-
west. It was reported that he traveled as far west as New Mexico.I 1 The
Sequoyah story is difficult to verify, but there is no doubt that Ross was
well aware of Sequoyah's travels. Ross even reprinted a report on the
elder's "last wanderings" in the Advocate in 1845. Written by a man called
the Worm, the article described the elder's final trip to Mexico to make
contact with Cherokees who had emigrated there to live under the protec-
tion of the Mexican government. 112
The first intertribal gatherings were reported to have occurred in 1837
and 1839 when the Cherokees tried to resolve disputes with western tribes
by inviting representatives to their new home and sponsoring several days
of talk and socializing."13 The first extensive coverage of these meetings
appeared in the Advocate in the spring of 1845 when William Potter Ross
traveled thirty-five miles southwest of Fort Gibson to a meeting site within
the new Creek Nation. 114 There he found over 700 Creeks gathered to re-
ceive delegations from resettled southeastern tribes (Choctaws, Chicka-
saws, and Seminoles), other tribes that had been forced from the Midwest
(Shawnees, Piankashaws, Delawares, Peorias, and Kickapoos), and local
groups (Osages, Caddoes, and Quapaws). Unfortunately, the Comanches-
109. An overview of this situation is provided in the opening pages of A.M. Gibson, An Indian
Territory United Nations: The Creek Council of 1845, 39 CHRONS. OKLA. 398 (1962).
110. John B. Davis, The Life and Work ofSequoyah, 8 CHRONS. OKLA. 149, 170-71 (1930).
111. Id. at 172-73.
112. The account was published on June 26, 1845, and reprinted decades later as The Story of
Sequoyah's Last Days, 12 CHRONS. OKLA. 25 (1934).
113. DAVID LA VERE, CONTRARY NEIGHBORS: SOUTHERN PLAINS AND REMOVED INDIANS IN
INDIAN TERRITORY 91-93 (2000).
114. See The Indian Council, CHEROKEE ADVOC., May 22, 1845.
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who had been specially invited in hopes of negotiating an end to their
raids-refused to attend. Ross noted that it was "a source of great regret"
that the Cherokees had not sent an official delegation, but added that this
was a consequence of a delay in notification and "by no means from any
indifference on the part of this people, to whatever relates to the peace and
prosperity of the whole Indian population."' 15
"During the council," Ross reported, "the pipe of peace was smoked,
the white paths cleared, the Council fire lighted afresh, and several
speeches of interest delivered by the heads of the different representations
present .... "116 The editor reprinted several of those speeches in the Advo-
cate. He also noted that "the nights were enlivened by the 'Terrapin Shell
dance' of the Muscogees, and the songs, drums, reeds and saltations (jump-
ing and leaping) of the Osages."' 117 All the delegations present appeared to
accept the arrival of new tribes from the east and expressed a desire for
peace. These messages of peace made the absence of Pawnee and Coman-
che delegations particularly ominous, but the tribes present represented a
broad region. The group even received a communication-and a pipe-
from the Great Lakes. A group of Winnebagoes, Chippeways, Tahwas, and
Menawallys sent a message expressing a desire to "be friendly with all
tribes, and to keep open the White path of peace, that we may train up our
children in it, and teach them to be friendly with all men."1 18
The council's Creek hosts were passive hosts for most of the gather-
ing, but at the close of the proceedings, Tuckabatchemicco, the Upper
Creek leader who had opened the council, offered a summary and a set of
suggestions. He urged everyone to follow the example of the Osages and
"bring in all the stolen horses" to the next general council. "Hereafter," he
added, "quit stealing horses from one another.... ." Tuckabatchemicco
added that he would give the absent Cherokees "a talk" urging them to stop
the "straggling men" in their country from stealing and committing murder.
Once the Indians succeeded in policing themselves, the Creek leader prom-
ised, the United States would have no reason to station troops in the terri-
tory. At that point, he suggested, the general council could act as a general
government: "When we shall all get at peace again with the different tribes,
the troops may be recalled or dispensed with .... The Principal Chief of
our different brothers must assemble their people when they get home and
115. Id. Historian Arrell Gibson annotated and reprinted the entire Advocate coverage of the coun-
cil in Gibson, supra note 109.
116. The Indian Council, supra note 114.
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explain all this. ... " Tuckabatchemicco's closing statement suggested
broadly that a stable, centralized tribal leadership similar to what the south-
eastern tribes had developed could eventually form a system of governance
in Indian Territory. 19
Ross's newspaper continued to cover intertribal conferences. In De-
cember 1845, he reported on efforts by Creek and Cherokee leaders to
make peace with the Comanches, and he traced a series of attempts made to
hold councils with the group the following year.120 Finally, in July 1846,
the Advocate reported extensively on the Cherokee involvement in a coun-
cil with this elusive goal and reprinted a number of speeches given by tribal
officials at that event. Elijah Hicks, a judge in the Cherokee supreme court,
expressed the tribe's perspective on these negotiations when he told the
assembled Comanches that "I feel towards you as my own brothers, all of
the aboriginal race, and having the same blood .... Therefore what I have
to say cannot deceive you because I am an Indian and my feelings are on
your side." Hicks urged his audience to accept a boundary for their territory
"to separate the Indians and the whites" and to consider a shift to agricul-
ture. "If you can change your present pursuits to that of agriculture and
homes," he noted "it will afford your young people with moderate labor,
numerous pursuits," and "lead to the enlargement of the human mind."
Hicks claimed credit for persuading the Comanches to agree to a new
treaty. 121
In the 1850s, as pressure mounted on the resettled Midwestern tribes
to relocate to Indian Territory, Ross was a ready defender of their right to
remain in their new homelands. He had written as early as 1845 that the
organization of new territories west of Missouri would violate the agree-
ments the eastern tribes had made when they moved across the Missis-
sippi. 122 Once reductions in their territory is made, he warned bitterly,
"[i]ntrusion will follow intrusion, wrong [will] be piled upon wrong till the
condition of the Indians [will] become intolerable, . . . and they
must.., resume their weary pilgrimage to some more distant land of prom-
ise, where they will be permitted to live undisturbed forever."'123
Ross's interest in tribal alliances and his readiness to defend treaty
rights in the 1850s indicate clearly that whatever Taney was thinking in his
legal decisions, Native American leaders writing and planning at the same
119. Id. at 411 (reprinting Tuckabatchemico's Talk in its entirety).
120. See Commission to the Comanches, CHEROKEE ADVOC., Dec. 18, 1845, at 2.
121. Elijah Hicks, Commission to the Comanches and Others, CHEROKEE ADVOC., July 2, 1846, at
1; see also Treaty with the Comanches and Other Tribes, May 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 844.
122. See Nebraska Territory, supra note 77, at 3.
123. Id.
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time were thinking something very different. The conferences themselves,
and the rhetoric surrounding them, supported Ross's political vision: they
supported intertribal alliances, they endorsed the tradition of treaty making,
and they offered a progressive image of tribal citizenship. In this way, they
provided an arena for tribes to demonstrate that they were institutions pre-
paring for the future, not defending the past.
Indian lawyers like William Potter Ross imagined a place for Indian
communities within the constitutional structure of the American nation, and
they believed that the legal instruments that enabled them to survive in the
West could be used to assure the survival of other tribes in other places.
Moreover, they operated on the assumption that tribal membership did not
mark them as "backward" or "uncivilized" people. There was a future out-
side the rigid and self-serving formulations of Jefferson, Jackson, and
Taney. It was a future guaranteed by treaties, federal statutes, and negoti-
ated solutions to complex political and cultural issues. And it was a future
only the Indians could imagine in 1857. Taney's vision was confined by the
past; Ross's was not. Ironically, it was the Chief Justice who was looking
backward and the Indian who looked to the future. And what is more: the
Indian's version of the future proved to be accurate.
POST-CONCLUSION REFLECTION
Anthropologist Patrick Wolfe has written provocatively about the "re-
gimes of difference" that define social roles in colonial settings. He argues
that African Americans and Indians in the United States, Aborigines in
Australia, and Afro-Brazilians in Brazil have each entered a particular co-
lonial context in which Europeans devised categories to buttress their rule
and perpetuate their control over land and labor. "At stake" in the formula-
tion of these regimes, Wolfe notes, "is the fundamental issue defining any
social system-who exploits whom in the production and reproduction of
power, wealth, and privilege?"'124 He argues that in North America the
relationship of Native Americans to the European colonizers centered on
land, while the parallel relationship with African Americans centered on
labor. The American tendency to draw a sharp line of difference between
colonists and African Americans while relaxing this practice with Indians
reflects this difference, Wolfe argues, "since assimilation reduces an in-
124. Patrick Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race, 106 AM. HIST.
REv. 866, 905 (2001).
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digenous population with rival claims to the land, while an exclusive strat-
egy enlarges an enslaved labor force."'1 25
We cannot leave Justice Taney and William Potter Ross without re-
flecting on the varying "regimes of difference" embodied in their words.
Taney-together with his predecessors Jefferson and Jackson--clearly
envisioned Indian communities as unencumbered by their racial identity.
Being Indian was not a barrier to their intimate interaction with colonists
and their settler governments. Jefferson could imagine their physical
amalgamation, while Jackson and Taney imagined they could become
members of the Americans' political community. The price for this
membership, of course, was that individuals would give up their
membership in an Indian political community and surrender their
communal territories to the new "American" state. African Americans, on
the other hand, were rejected as candidates for amalgamation and
permanently barred from membership in the American political state.
Wolfe's formulation--even in the simplified version rendered here-
is enormously helpful as we try to make sense of Dred Scott and the mo-
ment it occupies in the history of the United States. It sets the Chief Jus-
tice's words in a still-larger context, demonstrating again that whatever its
legal significance, his decision buttressed the efforts of white politicians to
maintain control over the settler state that was expanding so rapidly around
them. Despite the existence of thousands of African Americans and Native
Americans who did not fit the frameworks laid out in his decision, Taney
described the outlines of what Wolfe would call a "regime of difference"
that the jurist believed would enable the nation's political and economic
institutions to continue to function. This regime was rooted in the need to
maintain access to Indian land and African American labor; it was not
unrelated to similar regimes being devised in other settler states around the
globe, from Australia to Hawaii to Brazil to British Columbia. 126
Second, Wolfe's framework enables us to view the aftermath of Dred
Scott from a fresh perspective. Rather than seeing the decision in the con-
text of American race relations and the Civil War, Taney's pronounce-
ment-his statements about both Blacks and Indians-marks a moment in
125. Id. at 867.
126. In Hawaii, for example, a native government heavily influenced by missionary advisors
embarked on a process of land distribution following the "Great Mahele," or division of lands, of 1848.
This process of transforming a collectively managed indigenous landscape into a set of individual
landholdings (together with subsequent reforms that made it possible for foreigners to own these prop-
erties) enabled European settlers to take control of the local economy and, later, to overthrow the native
rulers of the kingdom. See generally JONATHAN KAY KAMAKAWIWO'OLE OSORIO, DISMEMBERING
LAHIU (2002).
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the history of struggles over racial and political hierarchies. Race is not a
single label that encompasses and describes all groups, dividing them onto
one or another side of a dividing line between "white" and "non-white."
Rather it is a category employed by those who seek to locate themselves
within a diverse and contested landscape. From this point of view, the cate-
gory of the colonizers-"white"-is a category of privilege and those who
identify with that term will likely define those they exploit as racially infe-
rior. Those who are marginalized and exploited in the colonial setting will
likely reject the colonizers' use of race as a hierarchical classification.
Those who have a more complex identity-such as Native American slave
holders who were both citizens of a distinct political entity and beneficiar-
ies of the settler's racial categories-would have a more complicated view.
They would embrace the conventional racial hierarchies with regard to
African Americans while rejecting the ideology of white supremacy. Look-
ing forward from 1857, it is clear that these categories would grow more
complex as differences within each group became more evident, the econ-
omy grew larger and more diverse, and the sources of group identity
changed. Political freedom, legal power, political influence, geographic
mobility, and demographic change would disrupt and re-form the simple
divisions embedded in Taney's decision. And Native thinkers like William
Potter Ross would continue to assert both the enduring significance of fed-
eral treaty commitments and the progressive potential of tribal govern-
ments.
Dred Scott offers more than a window on a moment or a single legal
mind. It also provides a profile of the "regimes of difference" whose crea-
tion defined the antebellum world and whose transformation-brought
about by white judges, Native American lawyers, and African American
leaders with many talents-would define the legal and political world that
emerged from the cataclysm of the Civil War and the slow process of de-
mocratization that followed it.
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